Kazakhstan currently finds itself in a unique and potentially sensitive position: it is the only country in the world participating in both competing AI alliances—the U.S.-led ‘Pax Silica’ and China’s ‘World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization’ (WAICO). With a Reuters report last month suggesting that the U.S. might pressure its partners to choose a side, the ‘multivector’ diplomatic policy of Central Asia—and Kazakhstan in particular—could soon face challenges.

Astana formally joined ‘Pax Silica’ on June 27. During the second Pax Silica summit held in Washington, D.C., Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Development Zhaslan Madiyev signed the relevant declaration and a joint statement regarding the ‘AI Opportunity Partnership.’

Less than three weeks later, Madiyev participated in the ‘World Artificial Intelligence Conference 2026’ in Shanghai and became a founding member of WAICO alongside 28 other countries.

As it stands, Washington’s Pax Silica has 24 signatory nations, with Taiwan listed as a “non-signatory participant.” On the other hand, Beijing counts 37 countries as members of WAICO, with Bangladesh holding “observer” status.

Launched in December 2025, Pax Silica has been branded by the U.S. State Department as its “flagship effort regarding AI and supply chain security, advancing a new economic security consensus among allied and trusted partners.” The declaration emphasizes supply chain resilience—covering everything from energy and critical minerals to manufacturing, technology, and infrastructure, specifically as they apply to AI supply chains.

Although China is not explicitly named, phrases in the declaration such as “reducing over-reliance” and “forging new relationships with trusted partners and suppliers committed to fair market practices” clearly point toward Beijing.

Meanwhile, WAICO was first proposed by China in July 2025 and came into existence in July 2026. It positions itself as an international organization focused on AI governance. Notably, UN Secretary-General António Guterres attended the signing ceremony as a guest, creating the impression—at the very least—of UN support.

Despite their differing focuses—with Pax Silica centering on physical elements and WAICO on governance and standards—both blocs are being framed as rivals in a new Cold War. Whether this analogy holds true depends on whether countries are effectively compelled to choose one side over the other.

And that day may come soon.

In mid-August, Reuters reported on an undated draft letter from the foreign ministry addressed to the 35 signatories of the ‘AI Opportunity Statement.’ The draft stated: “To be part of everything is to be part of nothing. Signing the Pax Silica declaration is not merely about membership; it is a commitment.” According to Reuters, the letter urged countries to “choose carefully” regarding AI and explicitly stated that membership in Pax Silica “cannot be maintained alongside membership in parallel initiatives that conflict with our expectations.” The letter did not explicitly name China.

As of this writing, it does not appear that the letter has been sent. However, the warning remains, and Central Asian countries may have already experienced it firsthand. In early August, Paul Kapur, the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, visited several countries, including Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In Kazakhstan, in addition to other meetings, he met with Madiyev to “discuss digital development.”

A clue regarding how the U.S. plans to proceed can be found in how Uzbekistan moves forward with the process of seeking dual membership, similar to Kazakhstan. Like Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan joined WAICO in July (as did Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan).

In late August, Furkat Sidikov, Uzbekistan’s ambassador to the U.S., told a group of journalists that Tashkent had requested to join Pax Silica. Noting that a diplomatic note had been sent to the State Department, he said: “Now the U.S. needs to confirm. We are ready to sign.”

Sidikov rejected the concept of a “red line” limiting participation to one initiative or another, calling it “counterproductive.” He stated that countries should have the opportunity to “be part of any kind of international cooperation.”

That is certainly the Central Asian perspective. What will Washington do now? Some key areas—such as dependence on critical minerals—are directly addressed by the U.S.-Central Asia partnership. However, as Edward Lemon and Bradley Jardine argued earlier this year, “the U.S. is losing the race for Central Asia’s critical minerals.” Despite various investment announcements, Russia and China continue to dominate the region’s critical mineral extraction sector.

Forcing the region to choose a side might not yield the outcome Washington desires.